World

The EU Cyber Resilience Act’s vulnerability reporting obligations officially kick in on September 11, and for many software vendors, the clock is already ticking. Under the new rules, when an actively exploited flaw is discovered, companies may have as little as 24 hours to notify authorities. That leaves very little room for guesswork.

According to guidance highlighted by ActiveState, the core challenge isn’t just patching the bug—it’s knowing two things with certainty: what exactly shipped to customers, and when you first learned about the vulnerability. Without that clarity, meeting the EU’s deadline becomes a logistical nightmare.

• The key is maintaining a precise software bill of materials (SBOM) for every release.
• Teams need to trace when a vulnerable component entered a product, not just when the fix was written.
• Incident response workflows must be pre-wired to flag “actively exploited” status quickly, since that triggers the shortest reporting window.

The regulation effectively forces vendors to treat supply chain visibility as a core compliance feature. If you can’t answer “which version of which library went out to which customer” in near real-time, you’re likely to miss the deadline—and face the consequences.

Source: BleepingComputer

Is your organization already tracking SBOMs down to the exact build level, or are you still relying on patch management guesswork when a CVE drops?

This month’s Patch Tuesday cycle from Microsoft is a record-breaker, with security updates addressing a total of 966 flaws across the ecosystem. Among these are two zero-day vulnerabilities that are already being actively exploited in the wild, making immediate validation and patching a priority for administrators.

The sheer volume of fixes this month signals a heavy focus on both remote code execution and privilege escalation vectors. While the specific details and identifiers for the two exploited zero-days have not been fully disclosed in the public summary, it is critical to review the official release notes for the affected components—particularly if your organization relies on Office, Exchange, or the Windows OS core—to identify which updates require urgent rollouts.

Given the scale of the release, we recommend prioritizing the deployment of the updates related to the exploited zero-days first, followed by any critical-rated flaws that affect internet-facing services. After applying the patches, verify that no legacy or third-party applications are broken by the changes, and monitor your endpoints for any post-patch anomalies.

• 966 total vulnerabilities fixed this cycle.
• Two separate zero-day flaws are under active attack.
• The update covers Windows, Office, and other core Microsoft products.

Source: Unknown

With the volume of changes this large, what is your team’s strategy for validating the patches against your critical applications without delaying the security fixes?

SAP’s September 2026 security patch batch tackles 20 vulnerabilities across its product lineup, with the spotlight falling on a critical memory corruption issue buried in the SAP Kernel. Tracked as maximum severity, the flaw—dubbed “OVERPASS”—can be triggered by an authenticated attacker, potentially leading to full system compromise or unauthorized privilege escalation. Given the kernel’s central role in running SAP applications, the risk is particularly acute for on-premise deployments where the attack surface is broader.

The update spans several core components, including SAP NetWeaver, SAP S/4HANA, and SAP Business Technology Platform, though the kernel fix takes priority due to its exploitability. SAP has flagged the vulnerability as requiring immediate attention, recommending that administrators review their current kernel patch levels and apply the relevant support package stacks without delay. No workarounds were provided, meaning the patch is the only viable path to remediation.

• The most critical issue is a kernel-level memory corruption vulnerability, rated 10.0 on the CVSS scale.
• Other patches address cross-site scripting, information disclosure, and denial-of-service issues, with lower severity ratings.
• SAP users should check their system’s kernel version against the September 2026 Support Package Stack release notes.

For those running hybrid or cloud environments, SAP notes that some fixes are automatically applied, but on-premise customers must manually deploy the updates. As always, it’s wise to test patches in a sandbox environment before rolling them out to production, given the kernel’s role in system stability.

Source: Unknown

Is your SAP landscape running the latest kernel patch, or are you deferring the update due to change-management constraints?

Third-party applications connected to Google Workspace often retain access long after their original purpose has been forgotten. This lingering permission is a hidden attack surface that can quietly lead to a breach, especially as organizations scale. Overly permissive integrations are a common weak point, and this webinar breaks down how those forgotten connections contribute to real-world incidents.

The session focuses on the practical side of reducing exposure, particularly for fast-growing companies that may lack visibility into their own connected apps. Instead of assuming an unused integration is harmless, the discussion highlights which security controls actually help close these gaps.

Key takeaways from the webinar include:

• The risk profile of third-party OAuth grants that remain active without oversight.
• Why default Google Workspace settings often fail to flag dormant or excessive permissions.
• Specific security controls—such as app access policies and regular audits—that can help reduce the attack surface.

If you are managing Google Workspace, this is worth a watch to see where your own environment might be exposed.

Source: Unknown

Is your organization actively auditing third-party Google Workspace integrations, or are you relying on default settings until an incident forces a review?

Threat actors are shifting away from using AI assistants for individual tasks and are now building multi-agent frameworks that can automate entire attack chains. These systems are being designed to handle credential theft at scale, from initial reconnaissance through to data exfiltration, with minimal human oversight.

The move marks a significant evolution in how AI is weaponized. Instead of a human operator prompting an LLM for help with a single step, these frameworks coordinate multiple specialized AI agents that each handle a different phase of an operation. This allows for faster execution of campaigns targeting large numbers of users or systems simultaneously, particularly focusing on harvesting login credentials.

While the article points to an increase in this activity, it does not reference any specific CVE identifiers or named malware families. The focus is on the methodology shift rather than a particular exploit.

• The trend centers on modular AI frameworks that chain together agents for tasks like phishing email generation, website spoofing, and credential validation.
• This approach reduces the technical barrier for entry, allowing less-skilled attackers to launch complex campaigns.
• Defenders are now facing the challenge of countering automated, AI-driven attacks that can adapt their lures in real time.

This suggests that traditional, static security awareness training may become less effective as lures become more personalized and dynamic. The speed at which these frameworks can rotate infrastructure and change tactics demands a more automated and AI-assisted defense posture.

Source: BleepingComputer

Is your organisation’s security operations team preparing for a potential surge in AI-coordinated credential theft, or are you still relying on manual threat hunting?

Adobe has shipped security updates to address a maximum-severity vulnerability in Adobe Commerce and Magento Open Source that is already being actively exploited in the wild.

The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-75650 with a CVSS score of 10.0, has been codenamed StyleSmuggler by security researchers at Sansec. The team discovered zero-day exploitation of the bug starting on September 4, 2026.

• Exploitation involves bypassing file upload restrictions to deliver a Rust-based backdoor and a PHP web shell onto affected servers.
• Researchers observed the malware being used to establish persistent remote access and execute arbitrary commands on compromised e-commerce instances.

Adobe has classified the issue as critical and urges administrators to apply the latest patches immediately.

• Review server logs for suspicious file uploads or unexpected PHP payloads around the identified timeframe.
• Audit user accounts with administrative privileges for unauthorized changes.
• If compromise is suspected, rotate credentials and API keys, and scan for the presence of the Rust backdoor or web shell indicators.

Source: The Hacker News

Has your team checked whether your Magento or Commerce deployment is exposed, and what steps are you taking to hunt for indicators before patching?

An exposed Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) database linked to Vietnamese aviation infrastructure left roughly 220 million passenger and crew records publicly accessible. The cache included names, passport numbers, dates of birth, nationalities, and flight details, with entries spanning 2017 to 2026.

Researchers found the cloud-hosted system reachable via a public path that still accepted default credentials, allowing unrestricted read access without any authentication bypass or sophisticated exploit. The dataset reportedly covered both passengers and crew members, raising concerns regarding long-term identity theft and targeted phishing campaigns.

• Exposed data: full names, passport numbers, dates of birth, nationalities, and flight itineraries.
• Timeframe: records from 2017 through 2026.
• Root cause: default credentials left active on a cloud-based APIS instance.
• Access method: direct connection to the exposed system using vendor-default login details.

The findings underscore persistent risks tied to misconfigured cloud deployments and unchanged factory settings, especially in border-control and travel infrastructure. It remains unclear whether the operator has restricted access or rotated credentials since the disclosure. Travelers whose data may be involved should monitor for unsolicited communications referencing flight history or passport details.

Source: BleepingComputer

For those in travel or aviation security, how is your organization auditing cloud-facing systems for default credential usage, and would a discovery like this prompt an immediate review of your APIS or PNR handling procedures?

TantoSec has published a working proof-of-concept that chains an AES-CBC padding oracle flaw in Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX into unauthenticated remote code execution. The exploit targets a specific, non-default configuration, and Progress released a patch for the underlying chain back in July. As of now, there are no confirmed reports of in-the-wild exploitation.

The attack hinges on a cryptographic weakness in the Telerik UI component's handling of encrypted data. By repeatedly sending crafted requests and observing the server's padding-error responses, an attacker can decrypt sensitive payloads without valid credentials. TantoSec's research demonstrates how this oracle can then be leveraged to forge a malicious request, ultimately achieving code execution on the target server.

It is important to note that this exploit does not affect every deployment. The attack only succeeds against applications that are using a configuration which is not the default. Organizations running standard, out-of-the-box settings are not exposed to this specific chain. Administrators should verify their deployment configuration against the guidance provided in the July advisory from Progress.

Given the severity of potential unauthenticated RCE, immediate action is recommended for affected users:

• Apply the latest patches released by Progress in July if you have not already done so.
• Review your Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX configuration to confirm whether you are running the vulnerable non-default setup.
• Monitor for any unsolicited encrypted payloads or anomalous network traffic directed at web servers, as padding-oracle attacks generate distinctive error patterns.

Source: The Hacker News

Has your team audited your Telerik UI deployments to confirm whether they fall into that non-default configuration, or are you waiting on the patch cycle to catch up?

Researchers have documented a curious wave of worm-like behavior tied to ConnectWise ScreenConnect, where rogue client instances are being used to push a malicious VBScript payload onto systems as they join a session. The activity, detailed by Huntress, hinges on a four-stage infection chain that ultimately delivers a payload to newly connected hosts—essentially turning the remote access tool into a distribution vector.

The three separate incidents observed so far share a common end goal but rely on widely different entry points, which suggests a level of adaptability in the operators' approach. Those initial vectors break down as follows:

• A tech-support scam abusing Microsoft Quick Assist to gain a foothold
• A phishing campaign delivering an MSI installer as the initial dropper
• A third, unidentified method that also led to the same ScreenConnect abuse

All three cases converge on the same post-exploitation routine: the attacker leverages the ScreenConnect client to drop a VBScript, which then progresses through additional stages before executing on the target. The scripting chain is notable for its modularity—each stage appears designed to fetch and execute the next piece, reducing the footprint left on disk at any single moment.

Huntress notes that the payload is specifically triggered when a new host connects to the rogue ScreenConnect server, implying the attackers have automated the delivery mechanism. This is not a case of a compromised legitimate server; rather, it points to threat actors hosting their own instance or modifying client behavior to achieve the desired spread.

For defenders, the key takeaway is to scrutinize any ScreenConnect client that initiates outbound connections to unapproved or unknown hosts. Organizations should also review their allowlists for remote access tools, particularly Quick Assist and ScreenConnect, since these are being repurposed rather than exploited through a vulnerability.

Mitigation steps to consider:

• Audit all ScreenConnect servers and clients in your environment for unauthorized instances.
• Restrict outbound connections from remote access tools to approved IP ranges or domains.
• Deploy behavioral detection rules for VBScript execution chains originating from remote support sessions.
• Monitor for Quick Assist or ScreenConnect process launches that do not correlate with active support tickets.
• Review MSI installer logs for unattended installation flags that could indicate phishing-driven deployment.

Source: The Hacker News

Are your remote support tools locked down to only sanctioned hosts, or could an unapproved ScreenConnect client connect out to an attacker-controlled server right now?

Turning off images in your email client used to be a reliable way to block tracking pixels and malicious visuals. That safeguard is eroding, as attackers have found a workaround using QR codes constructed entirely from text characters. These codes render and remain scannable even when image loading is disabled, quietly undermining a precaution many users still depend on.

Beyond that inbox annoyance, this week’s security landscape also featured a supply chain attack delivered through a trusted software repository, stealing credentials from unsuspecting developers. In the networking sphere, a protocol meant for secure management is being weaponized for router hijacks, and a fresh zero-day in Chrome demanded urgent attention from the patching community.

Key developments from the past week:

• Google Chrome 0-day: A critical vulnerability was actively exploited in the wild. Details remain sparse, but the advisory points to a flaw in the browser's rendering engine that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Users are strongly advised to update to the latest stable build immediately.
• Router hijacking via TFTP: Attackers are abusing the Trivial File Transfer Protocol, a basic protocol often left enabled in embedded devices, to overwrite router firmware or configuration files. This allows for persistent control without triggering standard integrity checks.
• Coder-focused supply chain attack: Malicious code was injected into a popular package hosted on a well-known developer platform. The payload was designed to harvest environment variables and local credential stores, specifically targeting users with access to production CI/CD pipelines.

For administrators and security teams, the response playbook remains consistent: prioritize patching for the browser flaw, audit network edge devices for exposed management interfaces, and review recent dependency updates for any anomalies.

Source: The Hacker News

Is your organization currently enforcing a policy that blocks or restricts TFTP traffic to network infrastructure, or is this something you are planning to address following this report?

Threat hunters have detailed a broad data theft and extortion campaign that is actively targeting Microsoft 365 and other software-as-a-service (SaaS) environments. The attack chain is notable for its reliance on help desk vishing, adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) token theft, and the use of residential-proxy infrastructure to mask malicious sign-ins.

The campaign specifically singles out high-level corporate officers, including directors, vice presidents, and other executive staff. By impersonating legitimate IT support personnel, the attackers initiate phone calls to these high-value targets in an attempt to lower their guard and extract credentials or approve multi-factor authentication (MFA) prompts.

Once initial access is established via stolen session tokens, the threat actors leverage residential proxies to make their traffic appear as if it originates from trusted, local IP addresses. This technique is designed to bypass geographic and risk-based conditional access policies that security teams often rely on.

The ultimate goal of the operation is data exfiltration followed by extortion. The disclosure serves as a reminder that even with robust technical controls in place, social engineering remains a primary vector for compromising enterprise SaaS accounts.

• Primary Targets: Executive staff (Directors, VPs, C-suite).
• Initial Vector: IT help desk vishing (voice phishing).
• Key Technique: AitM token theft to bypass MFA.
• Evasion Method: Residential-proxy sign-ins to circumvent IP-based security policies.
• Impact: Data theft and subsequent extortion.

Source: The Hacker News

Given the focus on C-suite and executive roles, is your organization adjusting its help desk verification procedures or adding additional friction to MFA prompts for these specific high-risk users?

Researchers have pulled back the curtain on a stealthy Chromium-based post-exploitation framework dubbed PEEP, which disguises itself as a benign bookmarks extension to maintain persistence inside Chrome and Edge browsers.

The toolkit is not a foothold itself—it demands pre-existing administrative privileges or code execution on the target host. Once that access is secured, its installer sidesteps the normal Web Store review process and any user consent prompts by injecting the extension directly into browser profiles. What makes this particularly nasty is how it forges Chromium’s own Secure Preferences file, effectively tricking the browser into treating the malicious add-on as both trusted and user-approved.

That means PEEP can survive browser restarts and operate quietly under the radar, giving attackers a reliable channel to issue commands on the compromised machine through the browser itself.

Key technical takeaways:

• PEEP requires prior administrative or code execution access—it is not a remote code execution exploit.
• It targets Chrome and Edge by modifying profile directories directly.
• The installation bypasses Web Store checks and user prompts by forging Secure Preferences.
• The extension’s purpose is post-compromise persistence and host-level command execution.

This isn’t a vulnerability in the browsers themselves—it’s an abuse of trust mechanisms that assumes the attacker already owns the box. Defenders should focus on monitoring abnormal modifications to browser profile directories and auditing extensions that appear without a corresponding Web Store installation event.

Source: The Hacker News

Has your organization taken steps to audit browser profiles for unauthorized extension injections, or do you rely on endpoint detection alone to catch this kind of post-exploitation movement?

Attackers are actively chaining two recently disclosed security flaws in MikroTik RouterOS to seize control of devices that have SSH services exposed online. The campaign targets routers that have not yet been updated with the vendor’s latest patches.

The exploitation chain combines a privilege escalation vulnerability with an authentication bypass issue. When used together, they allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain administrative access to the router. Once inside, the attackers can modify device settings, inject malicious configurations, or use the compromised router as a pivot point for further network intrusions.

The flaws affect RouterOS versions that predate the latest stable release. MikroTik has already addressed the issues in newer firmware builds, and administrators are strongly advised to apply those updates without delay. In addition to patching, it is recommended to restrict SSH access to trusted IP addresses only, and to disable the service entirely if it is not strictly required.

• Affected: MikroTik RouterOS versions prior to the latest patched release.
• Mitigation: Update to the latest RouterOS build, enforce firewall rules to limit SSH exposure, and audit device logs for unusual activity.

Routers are often overlooked in patch management routines, yet they remain a high-value target for attackers seeking persistent access to internal networks. Given that this exploitation is already underway, immediate action is warranted.

Source: BleepingComputer

Is your organisation currently exposing SSH on any MikroTik devices, and if so, how are you prioritising the rollout of these critical updates?

Research indicates that a zero-day flaw resembling a file-upload bypass is being actively exploited against Magento and Adobe Commerce systems. Tracked by external researchers under the moniker “StyleSmuggler,” the issue is understood to affect all versions of both platforms, leaving a wide swath of online storefronts exposed. The attacks have a clear objective: dropping a Linux ELF backdoor onto vulnerable servers to establish persistent remote access.

The vulnerability lies in the way these platforms handle certain uploaded files, allowing attackers to smuggle a malicious payload past validation and onto the filesystem. While specific technical details remain partially under wraps to give merchants time to patch, the observed behavior indicates a critical remote code execution risk. Security analysts have noted that exploitation attempts appear to be opportunistic, scanning for unpatched installations hosting shopping carts.

For administrators, the primary takeaway is urgency. Since the flaw is zero-day, there is no patch available at the time of disclosure for every iteration, but immediate steps should be taken:

• Audit and review web server access logs for any unexpected file uploads, especially those with non-standard extensions.
• Check for newly created files in the media or var directories that do not originate from a known admin session.
• Inspect running processes for any unfamiliar binaries named similarly to common Linux services.
• Harden file permissions on the pub/media and var/import folders to restrict write access.
• Monitor outbound network connections from the web server for calls to unusual IP addresses.

Until an official security bulletin is issued for your specific version, consider temporarily disabling any custom modules that handle file imports or image resizing, as these vectors are often leveraged in such attacks. The vendor has been contacted, but given the active exploitation, assume your environment is a target.

This serves as another reminder that the e-commerce ecosystem is a high-value target, and third-party extensions can often widen the attack surface beyond the core application.

Source: Unknown

For those of you running Magento on shared hosting, what process are you using to check for these rogue binaries without full root access?

A phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operation tracked as BigBear 2.0 has been observed compromising Microsoft 365 environments at scale. According to telemetry, the campaign successfully bypassed multi-factor authentication (MFA) and harvested over 5,000 credentials across 258 organizations.

The attack methodology relies on adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques to intercept session tokens. Below is a concise overview of the operational details and indicators.

• Target scope: 258 unique organizations; more than 5,000 Microsoft 365 accounts compromised.
• Primary tactic: AiTM phishing to steal session cookies, allowing attackers to bypass MFA requirements.
• Payload focus: Microsoft 365 login pages, often using lookalike domains and urgency-based lures.
• Post-exploitation: Stolen sessions are typically used for data exfiltration and follow-up business email compromise (BEC).

Practical mitigation steps

• Enforce conditional access policies that require device compliance or trusted locations, not just a one-time password.
• Review sign-in logs for anomalous session activity, particularly where MFA was satisfied but geolocation or IP reputation appears suspicious.
• Implement phishing-resistant MFA, such as FIDO2 security keys, where feasible.
• Monitor for newly registered domains that mimic your organisation’s login portal.

Given the low cost of entry for such PhaaS platforms, it is likely this pattern will continue to evolve. Organisations relying solely on OTP-based MFA should treat these campaigns as a direct threat to their identity perimeter.

Source: Unknown

Has your team reviewed sign-in logs for unusual session behaviour, or have you already moved to phishing-resistant MFA?

Australian edtech provider Mathspace has disclosed a data breach impacting over 1 million students, staff, and parents. The attack targeted its internal Metabase reporting system, which was compromised by unauthorised actors. While the company has not specified the exact intrusion method, it confirmed that sensitive personal information was exfiltrated from the platform.

The breached data includes names, email addresses, school names, and user roles. For a subset of affected individuals, additional fields such as phone numbers and student academic records may also have been exposed. Mathspace has stated that it does not store payment card details or government-issued identifiers like Social Security numbers, and it believes the risk of identity theft is limited. Still, the sheer volume of records involved—exceeding one million—places this among the larger edtech incidents in the region.

Affected users should be aware of the following:

• The breach was discovered after unauthorised access to the Metabase analytics dashboard.
• Notifications are being sent directly to impacted users via email.
• The company has engaged external cybersecurity experts and is coordinating with relevant data protection authorities.

Mathspace has urged users to remain cautious of phishing attempts that may reference the incident. It also recommends enabling multi-factor authentication on any accounts associated with the platform, although the compromised data did not include passwords. The company says it has since secured the reporting system and deployed additional monitoring to prevent further unauthorised access.

The disclosure means that for any organisation or family using Mathspace, the immediate concern is not just the exposed records but how quickly the vendor can confirm the full scope of the exfiltration. Given that the data includes academic records, institutions should consider reviewing what information they have shared with third-party learning platforms.

Source: BleepingComputer

Have you or your institution received a breach notification from Mathspace, and how are you approaching the risk related to the exposed academic records?

Trezor has revised the impact of a data breach disclosed last August, revealing that the incident now affects approximately 81,000 customers total. The initial disclosure estimated around 14,000 individuals were impacted, but the company has since determined that an additional 67,000 U.S.-based users were exposed through its third-party shipping and logistics partner, ShipMonk.

The compromised data stems from a breach at ShipMonk, not directly from Trezor's own infrastructure. Based on current information, the exposed records are limited to contact and shipping details, such as names, physical addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses. Critically, Trezor states that no cryptocurrency funds, device seeds, or transactional data were involved, as those systems remain segregated from the logistics pipeline.

For those potentially affected, the primary risks involve targeted phishing campaigns or physical mail scams, rather than direct theft of digital assets. Trezor advises users to remain cautious of unsolicited communications that reference the breach and to always verify requests through official channels.

• Users should be wary of emails or SMS messages claiming to offer "security updates" or requiring device synchronization.
• Avoid entering recovery seeds into any website or software, as legitimate support will never ask for them.
• Monitor physical mail for suspicious packages or letters requesting personal information.

Source: BleepingComputer

Has your organization received any breach-related notification from Trezor or ShipMonk, and how are you planning to handle the increased phishing risk for affected customers?

ConnectWise is alerting administrators to a newly discovered vulnerability affecting its ScreenConnect remote access solution, with an official patch not yet available. The company has confirmed it expects to release a fix later this week, but until then, it is providing temporary mitigation steps to help reduce exposure.

The issue impacts the remote support and access tool, which is widely used by managed service providers (MSPs) and IT teams. Given the privileged nature of ScreenConnect deployments, any flaw in this software carries significant risk, as exploitation could potentially lead to unauthorized access or system compromise. While specific technical details of the vulnerability remain limited in the public advisory, ConnectWise is urging all users to treat the situation with urgency.

• Administrators should review the temporary measures outlined by ConnectWise and apply them as soon as possible.
• Consider restricting outbound network access from ScreenConnect instances to only necessary endpoints.
• Audit user accounts and sessions for any suspicious activity, especially those with elevated privileges.
• Monitor official ConnectWise channels for the prompt release of the security patch.

Until the permanent fix is deployed, organizations relying on ScreenConnect should balance operational needs against the heightened risk, potentially limiting remote access capabilities where feasible. This situation serves as a reminder that even trusted remote management tools can become attack vectors, requiring rapid response protocols.

Source: BleepingComputer

Is your team currently running ScreenConnect, and what immediate steps are you taking to restrict access while waiting for the vendor's patch?

Researchers have detailed a new strain of compiled V8 JavaScript malware dubbed JSCeal, which is capable of bypassing Google authentication through the theft of session cookies.

The malicious payloads are heavily obfuscated using javascript-obfuscator, employing a layered approach to evade analysis. Key protection mechanisms observed by Check Point Research include:

• RC4-protected strings to conceal data
• Control-flow flattening to disrupt code analysis
• Proxy functions to obscure function calls
• Operation wrappers to further complicate reverse engineering

JSCeal's capabilities extend beyond simple credential theft, encompassing broader surveillance and traffic-interception functions. The malware is compiled for the V8 JavaScript engine, a departure from typical script-based threats, which allows it to operate with greater stealth and complexity.

Source: The Hacker News

Given the malware's reliance on stolen session cookies rather than traditional credential phishing, how is your organization monitoring for suspicious session anomalies in Google Workspace?

N-able has rolled out an emergency hotfix for a maximum-severity remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting its N-central remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform. The flaw is being exploited in ongoing attacks, prompting the vendor to urge customers to apply the patch immediately.

The vulnerability, which carries a CVSS score of 10.0, stems from an authentication bypass issue in the N-central server's Java deserialization mechanism. Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with system privileges on the underlying host. The vendor has not yet assigned a CVE ID at the time of this advisory, but the hotfix is available via the usual N-central update channel.

• Affected component: N-central server (all supported versions prior to the hotfix)
• Attack vector: Network-based, unauthenticated
• Impact: Full system compromise, including potential lateral movement into managed endpoints

According to N-able, the attacks observed in the wild are targeted and appear to follow a specific pattern. The company has not published detailed indicators of compromise at this stage, but strongly recommends:

• Immediate application of the hotfix to all N-central servers
• Reviewing server logs for unusual deserialization activity or unexpected outbound connections
• Resetting credentials for any service accounts used by the N-central platform
• Enforcing multi-factor authentication on all administrative access

Given the severity and active exploitation, organizations using N-central should treat this as a priority incident response item, not a routine patch cycle update.

Source: Unknown

Has your team already applied the hotfix, and are you monitoring for the targeted attack patterns N-able described?