This creates a significant blind spot. SOC 2 was designed around a model where access and actions could be traced back to a human user or a clearly defined service account. AI agents blur that line. They authenticate as people, act autonomously, and may perform sensitive operations without triggering the kinds of alerts that auditors and security teams expect for human-driven behavior or conventional machine accounts.

The core concern is that agent identities are not adequately covered by current control frameworks. If an agent inherits a human's permissions and acts on their behalf, traditional controls around least privilege, access reviews, and activity monitoring may not capture what is actually happening. This can leave organizations with compliance attestations that look clean on paper while real operational risk goes unaddressed.

Token Security argues that SOC 2 needs to evolve to explicitly account for agent identities, including how they are provisioned, monitored, and governed. Without that adaptation, the framework risks becoming less relevant as autonomous agents take on more responsibility inside enterprise systems.

Key points to consider:

• AI agents can act through human credentials, making their activity hard to separate from genuine user actions
• Existing SOC 2 controls may not identify or flag agent-driven behavior
• Traditional service accounts and human accounts do not map cleanly onto autonomous agent identities
• Governance gaps around provisioning, permissions, and monitoring of agents remain largely unaddressed
• Failure to adapt could reduce the practical value of SOC 2 attestations

Source: Publication Name

How is your organization handling identity and access governance for AI agents that operate under human credentials?