The findings underline that speed is not solely the domain of automated tooling. While much of the current discussion focuses on AI lowering the barrier to entry for less capable actors, Sysdig's telemetry shows that experienced human operators remain capable of extremely fast lateral movement once they gain a foothold.

Key points from the report:

• The initial access vector was a remote code execution flaw in Marimo, an open-source Python notebook.
• From that foothold, the attacker reached an SSH bastion in roughly eight seconds.
• The case demonstrates how rapidly post-exploitation activity can unfold when a knowledgeable operator is at the keyboard.

Sysdig's broader point is that defenders should not assume fast breakout times are always the signature of automation. Human-driven intrusions can be just as swift, which shortens the window for detection and response.

Source: The Hacker News

Does your environment expose notebook platforms like Marimo to untrusted networks, and how are you segmenting them from critical assets such as SSH bastions?