The first step for defenders is not to mass-reset passwords but to triage the exposed identity by severity. Prioritize accounts with administrative privileges, access to financial systems, or those connected to critical cloud infrastructure. For each compromised user, you must determine whether the stolen access is still viable—many infostealer logs are sold or traded weeks after initial infection, but session tokens can remain valid if not explicitly revoked.

• Assume the session is compromised: Immediately invalidate all active sessions and refresh tokens for the affected accounts.
• Reset credentials: Force a password change and re-enrollment of MFA devices, even if the password itself was not in the log.
• Check for downstream activity: Review authentication logs for anomalies post-infection, such as logins from new IPs or unusual geographic locations.
• Hunt for lateral movement: Determine if the stolen session was used to access internal apps or to pivot toward other systems.

The critical distinction is between a password leak and a session hijack. If only the password was stolen, MFA still offers a roadblock. If the session token was taken, the attacker is already inside the perimeter. Flare emphasizes that rapid, targeted response—rather than blanket resets—saves time and reduces operational disruption while addressing the actual risk window.

Source: BleepingComputer

Has your team already established a playbook for triaging infostealer alerts, or are you still relying on manual checks of the dark web for exposed credentials?